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The issue of the implication of interlinkage of factor markets on the allocative efficiency 
level of the farm households deserves a special attention in the light of the controversy among 
two distinct schools of thought: the Neoclassical and the Marxist. An attempt has been made in 
the paper to measure allocative and cost efficiencies of the interlinked holding vis-à-vis a 
comparable group of non-interlinked holding in the framework of Data Envelopment Analysis. 
Empirical evidence establishes the Neo-classical proposition that interlinked factor markets can 
be considered as one of the “efficiency improving institutional change” in rural agrarian 
economy.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Efficiency in resource allocation has a far-reaching impact on the observed level of 
agricultural output. In the process of enhancing allocative efficiency
1
 in agricultural 
production, institutional inefficiencies in rural economy need to be addressed properly. 
But, it is difficult to do justice to the entire web of institutions that comprise rural society. 
However, two notable rural institutions which play a dominant role in providing 
economic well-being of the rural people are: the institutions of tenancy and rural credit. It 
is interesting to note that the terms and conditions of the institution of tenancy are often 
influenced by the transactions in other non-tradable factor markets, notably labour, draft 
animal and credit [Pant (1983); Bliss and Stern (1982); Jaynes (1982)]. The most obvious 
of these is the imperfectly developed credit market in the sense that asset poor tenants can 
overcome a credit constraint by developing their own “access institutions”. Interlinked 
credit tenancy transactions are considered as an important form of institutional 
adaptations that the institution of tenancy has modified to substitute the imperfectly 
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1A firm is said to have realised allocative efficiency if it is operating with the optimal combination of 
inputs, given their respective prices. Technical efficiency reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximum output 
from a given set of inputs. These two measures are combined to provide a measure of total economic efficiency. 
The term economic efficiency can be interchangeably used as cost efficiency or overall efficiency [Coelli, et al. 
(2002)]. 
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developed credit market. Peasant rationality, in this context, substantiates the Coase 
theorem argument that individuals would quickly get together to eliminate any sort of 
distortions in the allocation of resources which, in turn, would ensure the establishment 
of efficient institutional arrangement [Stiglitz (1989)].  
In the existing literature, there are two distinct strands of thought on the issue of 
the implication of interlinking of factor markets and its repercussion on allocative 
efficiency: the Neoclassical and the Marxist. Marxists viewed interlinked transactions as 
a method of surplus extraction of the tenant at the hands of the landlord [Bhaduri (1973, 
1977, 1983); Bharadwaj (1974, 1985); Pearce (1983); Prasad (1973, 1974)]. It is in the 
interest of the landlord to extract maximum surplus from his tenants and keep them in 
perpetual indebtedness. Bhaduri, a noted exponent of the Marxist approach, termed this 
phenomenon as ‘forced commerce’. In a formal model, Bhaduri (1973) argued that a 
landlord who also provides consumption loans to his tenant may have no incentive to 
adopt yield-increasing innovations if his income from his loans to the tenant goes down 
sufficiently to offset his share of the increased yield. Thus, in the Marxist formulation, 
interlinkage is seen as a weapon for improving the effectiveness of surplus extraction, 
and thus an inefficient deal in some sense.  On the other hand, in the Neo-classical 
framework, market interlinkages emerge in the presence of imperfections, asymmetry of 
information etc., and  ‘it is motivated by the desire for economic efficiency, not 
necessarily by the desire for further exploitation of the worker’ [Stiglitz (1986)]. 
Interlinked markets are considered to be efficient because the tenant has imperfect access 
to certain input markets and interlinkage is an arrangement through which the landlord 
(principal) makes such inputs available to the tenant. Contrary to the Marxian approach 
which termed interlinkage as an exploitative mode of contract motivated by the unequal 
relations of power, rooted in the unequal access to productive resources, in Neo-classical 
literature it is considered as a voluntary contract among free economic agents [Bharadwaj 
and Das (1975); Mishra (n.d)]. However, the possibility of exploitation cannot be ruled 
out in Neo-classical framework if the tenant-borrowers are pushed to their reservation 
income and the remaining income is appropriated by the landlord-moneylenders 
[Braverman and Stiglitz (1982)]. Broadly, in the Neo-classical
2
 interpretation, interlinked 
transaction is viewed as highly ‘personalised’ relation between transacting agents and is 
evolved to ensure the ‘double coincidence of wants’ without which non-monetised 
economies tend to be unfeasible or inefficient [Cheung (1969); Bardhan (1980); 
Braverman and Srinivasan (1981); Braverman and Stiglitz (1982); Basu (1983)]. An 
interlinked system of personalised transactions may overcome the problem of 
inefficiencies of incomplete and imperfect markets (particularly of credit and insurance) 
and thus facilitates increased efficiency and higher social welfare. This can be achieved 
by internalising the adverse externalities (like risk aversion, low work effort, loan default 
etc.) of imperfect markets. Moreover, interlinking of tenancy and credit contracts can act 
as a screening device to identify tenant’s ability and thus leads to efficient allocation of 
resources [Braverman and Guasch (1984)]. In this situation, the landowner provides a 
consumption loan to the tenant to induce him to work harder in the presence of moral 
hazard, advances production loans to enable the tenant to adopt improved package of 
practices and shares in cost to increase the intensity of input use, all aimed at getting 
 
2A concise summary of Neo-classical theories on tenancy is given by Quibria and Rasid (1984). 
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increased agricultural yield [Braverman and Stiglitz (1982); Mitra (1983)]. Thus 
interlinkage can be viewed as a mechanism of increasing efficiency, higher production, 
and more rapid innovation—in short, higher social welfare [Ellis (1988)]. The Neo-
classical school propagates for the superiority of interlinked contracts over non-
interlinked ones under certain specified conditions: uncertainty [Newberry (1975)], 
limited liability [Newberry (1975); Basu, et al. (2000)], contract linearity [Ray and 
Sengupta (1989)], moral hazard [Braverman and Stiglitz (1982)], adverse selection 
[Banerji (1995)], landlord as the first mover in the sequential game [Basu, et al. (2000)] 
and monogamous tenancy
3
 [Roy and Serfes (2002)]. Under this backdrop of controversy 
among two distinct schools of thought: the Neoclassical and the Marxist, an attempt has 
been made in the paper to evaluate allocative and cost efficiencies of the interlinked 
holding vis-à-vis a comparable group of non-interlinked holding in the framework of 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  
 The paper is divided into five sections. The next section deals with the data 
sources of the study. The methodological framework to estimate allocative efficiency is 
analysed in Section 3. Section 4 explores the nature of interlinked factor markets in the 
study area. In Section 5, an attempt has been made to evaluate the implications of 
interlinking of factor markets on allocative and cost efficiencies of the households by 
using primary data of rural West Bengal. In particular, we seek to evaluate the efficiency 
of interlinked households’ vis-à-vis a comparable group of non-interlinked households. 
The section also deals with comparison between observed and optimal cost minimising 
input quantities at given levels of input prices. In addition, the section considers the  
association between allocative efficiency across operated farm size and participation 
under alternative interlinkage patterns. The concluding remarks have been presented in 
Section 6. 
 
2.  DATA SOURCES 
The study is based on a field survey in rural West Bengal in the year 2006-07. The 
purpose of the survey was to explore the nature of interlinked transactions in land leasing 
markets and the role of credit in bringing out allocative efficiency in agriculture in West 
Bengal. Taking into consideration the extent and the incidence of tenancy practices, out 
of 18 districts of West Bengal, the district of Burdwan has been selected for the survey.
4
 
In the second stage, among the 31 blocks under Burdwan district, one block, namely, 
Raina I has been selected on the consideration of the existence of diversified nature of 
agricultural practices and the co-existence of varied farms of interlinked transactions. 
Again, block Raina I has been stratified into two distinct agro climatic zones-one, 
developed zone with canal irrigation and the other, underdeveloped zone with rain-fed 
 
3Roy and Serfes (2002) distinguish between two concepts of tenancy: polyandrous and monogamous 
tenancy. Polyandrous tenancy is the institutional arrangement where a tenant works for more than one landlord 
whereas under monogamous tenancy one tenant works under a single landlord.   
4The district of Burdwan comprised of 7.83 percent of total leased in land (wholly and partly) in the 
state of West Bengal. Only two hill districts, Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, comprised of 12.11 and 21.28 percent of 
leased in area respectively are above Burdwan district. However, terms of leasing in the hill districts are distinct 
from other districts of West Bengal (Agricultural Census, 2000-01). Thus the choice of the district of Burdwan 
as our survey area is purely based on the ground of the dominant practice of land leasing for crop cultivation in 
the state.   
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agriculture. From the developed zone, the villages, namely, Saktia and Anguna have been 
chosen, whereas the villages namely, Dhamash and Boro have been chosen from the 
underdeveloped zone under the same criteria.
5
 Once the villages are selected, 203 
sampling units, the farm-households, have been chosen using stratified random sampling 
of farmers with probability being proportional to the farm size so that the sample can 
represent the actual proportion of all the five strata of the farmers. It is to be noted that 
203 households operate over 303 agricultural holdings under alternative mode of 
cultivation. Our empirical analysis is restricted to 303 holdings. The farm households 
have been divided into five categories covering landless agricultural labourers, marginal 
farmers (less than 2.5 acre), small farmers (2.5–5 acre), medium farmers (5–10 acre) and 
large farmers (above 10 acre).    
 
3.  METHODOLOGY: DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
In the study, we have used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to examine the cost 
minimising behaviour and in turn, measure the allocative efficiency of farm households. 
In such a DEA framework, a linear programming method is used to construct a non-
parametric piecewise frontier over the data, so as to measure efficiencies relative to this 
surface. Following Coelli, et al. (2002), the allocative and cost efficiencies can be 
measured using the Constant Returns to Scale Input Oriented DEA model.
6
  In our study 
a multi input-multi output DEA model is used.  
Following Coelli, et al. (2002), let us consider the situation with N decision 
making units (DMU). Each of the n DMUs produce Q output using V different inputs. A 
cost minimising linear programming problem is solved for each DMU. The CRS input 
oriented DEA model for the ith DMU is given by 
*, ix
Min
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Where  wi = vector of unit price of inputs utilised by DMUi 
*
ix = vector of input quantities of DMUi with respect to production cost 
minimisation 
yki =  amount of output k produced by DMUi 
 
5The selection of district, block and villages are based on a priori information and hence it is purposive 
and non-random. For further details about the selection of sampling units based on primary and secondary data, 
see Laha (2009). 
6This approach of non-parametric mathematical programming approach to frontier estimation was first 
developed by Charnes, Coper, and Rhodes (1978). 
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xji = amount of input j utilised by DMUi 
N1 = an N  1 vector of one 
1 = dual variables. 
The total cost efficiency (CE) or economic efficiency (EE) of the ith firm is 
measured by the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost as 
/ *
/
i i
i i
w x
CE
w x
  
The allocative efficiency is calculated residually by using the following 
relationship between cost efficiency (CE) and technical efficiency (TE) as  
CEAE
TE
  
The above mentioned production cost minimisation exercise can be solved by 
using a number of different computer programmes. In this study, we have used DEAP
7
 
Version 2.1 for the measurement of both allocative and cost efficiencies.     
 
4.  NATURE OF INTERLINKED FACTOR MARKETS 
In a rural agrarian economy, it is often seen that factor markets are not independent 
of one another, rather there is inter-connection among them in the sense that terms of one 
contract is contingent upon the terms of another. In such an interlinked deal, two or more 
independent exchanges are simultaneously agreed upon [Basu (1983)]. If an input dealer 
provides inputs to a farmer on a credit basis and the prices of input and interest rate are 
simultaneously agreed upon, then the input market and credit market are said to be 
interlinked. This issue of interlinkage has attracted much attention world-wide from 
anthropological enquiries
8
 to various schools of development economics [Bharadwaj and 
Das (1975); Bardhan and Rudra (1978); Bardhan (1980); Braverman and Srinivasan 
(1981); Braverman and Stiglitz (1982); Basu (1983, 1987); Gupta (1987); Sarap (1991); 
Bose (1993); Bardhan and Udry (1999); Basu, et al. (2000); Gill (2000)]. Like other parts 
of India, several types of interlinked transactions are commonly observed in rural West 
Bengal [Bardhan (1984); Dutta (2002); Chaudhuri (2004); Bhattacharyya (2005, 2007)].  
It is interesting to note that broadly we have come across the co-existence of two types of 
interlinked transactions: one-tier and two-tier interlinkages. One-tier interlinkage implies 
simultaneous transactions in two agrarian markets, e.g., credit-labour, credit-input and 
credit-product.
9
  In the two-tier interlinkage, on the other hand, transactions take place in 
more than two markets where one landlord simultaneously acts as employer as well as 
producer and negotiates two types of interlinked transactions-credit-labour and credit-
 
7See Coelli “A Guide to DEAP Version 2.1: A Data Envelopment Analysis (Computer) Programme”. 
(CEPA Working Paper 96/08.) 
8See Bardhan (1980) for a survey on anthropological research. 
9In our study villages three ways of one tier interlinkage are found in practice: Credit-input interlinkage 
implies that the farmers take loan from the input dealer in kind and repaid in kind or cash. Credit-labour 
interlinkage implies that the agricultural worker takes loan from his employers and repaid in terms of his labour 
service. Credit-product interlinkage implies that the producer takes loan from the trader and sells at least a part 
of his product to him. 
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product [Gupta (1993); Dutta (2002)].
10
  The two-tier interlinkage can be of various 
forms, as observed in our study area: the labour-cum-producer negotiates for two types of 
interlinked transactions—credit-labour and credit-product where the quantum of credit 
demand plays the instrumental role in simultaneous fixing of transactions. The demand 
for credit is attempted to be met by negotiating first-tier interlinked transactions in the 
form of credit-labour interlinkage, while, the unmet demand for credit is spilled over in 
the second-tier of interlinked transactions in the form of credit-product interlinkage. The 
two-tier interlinkage is also found in practices involving credit, labour, input and product 
markets. In our study on West Bengal, a significant percentage (61.58 percent) of sample 
households are involved in interlinked transactions. Credit-input interlinkage is the 
predominant form of one tier interlinkage in the study area; it accounts for 36 percent of 
total interlinked deals. This is followed by credit-labour and credit-product interlinkage. 
It is to be noted in this context that the types of interlinkages are sensitive to the nature of 
crop cultivation. Commercial crops, like potato and boro paddy cultivations, are usually 
associated with two-tier interlinkage where the same input dealer-cum-product seller is 
usually involved in input and product markets. In fact, there are three variant forms of 
‘two-tier’ interlinkage encompassing credit, labour, input and product markets which 
together constitute 55.2 percent of total interlinked transactions.  
The size-class distribution of various types of interlinked contract is presented 
in Table 1. Empirical evidence reveals that the incidence of interlinked transactions 
is associated with the size-class distribution of land ownership pattern. The 
proportion of interlinked households is largely confined to the marginal (65.57 
percent) and small farmers (70.59 percent) irrespective of the types of interlinkage. 
The marginal and small farmers together constitute 83.2 percent of the total 
interlinked transactions in our study area. The size class classification of the 
proportion of households involved in interlinked transactions reveals that there is 
negative association between the farm size incidence of interlinked transactions.
11
 
However, the association is insignificant due to greater concentration of households 
in marginal and small farm categories.  
It is to be noted in this context that the majority of small and marginal farmers 
enhance their operated land by leasing in land from the adjacent holdings of the 
landlords. About 87 percent of the tenants in our study area are under the category of 
landless and marginal farmers. This group of farmers is pre-dominantly involved in 
interlinked transactions. About 67 percent of asset poor tenant households borrow both 
for consumption and production purposes with  pre-determined terms and conditions by 
linking  their labour or crops  with  those of the landlord-cum-creditors. Such practices of  
 
10Dutta (2002) found that same employer-cum-producer is on the one hand involved in interlinked 
credit-labour contract, and on the other hand, involved in interlinked credit-product contract. The producer takes 
loan from the trader with the commitment that he will sell at least a part of this product to him and then uses 
that loan either in purchasing non-labour inputs or in giving further consumption loan to the workers. So with 
the same producer, there is simultaneous existence of credit-product interlinkage and credit-labour interlinkage. 
On the basis of the empirical observation, Gupta (1993) in a theoretical paper has given an explanation of this 
simultaneous existence of these two types of interlinkage using the consumption efficiency hypothesis of 
Leibenstein (1957). 
11The value of Pearson measure of correlation is estimated at –0.73235. 
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Table 1 
Number of Households Involved in Various Types of Interlinked Credit Transactions  
Operated 
Land 
(in Acre) 
No. of 
House- 
holds 
One-tier Interlinkage Two-tier Interlinkage 
Total 
Proportion of 
Interlinked 
Households 
(in percent) 
Credit-
labour 
Credit- 
input 
Credit-
product 
Both 
Credit-
labour and 
Credit-
product 
Both 
Credit-
labour and 
Credit-
input 
Both 
Credit-
input and 
Credit-
product 
Landless 
 
10 5 
(62.5) 
0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
5 
(4.00) 
50.00 
0.1-2.5 
 
122 3 
(37.5) 
20 
(44.44) 
3 
(100.00) 
25 
(86.21) 
10 
(83.34) 
19 
(67.86) 
80 
(64.00) 
65.57 
2.5-5 
 
34 0 
(0.00) 
15 
(33.33) 
0 
(0.00) 
3 
(10.34) 
1 
(8.33) 
5 
(17.86) 
24 
(19.20) 
70.59 
5-10 
 
27 0 
(0.00) 
8 
(17.78) 
0 
(0.00) 
1 
(3.45) 
1 
(8.33) 
3 
(10.71) 
13 
(10.40) 
48.15 
Above 
10 
10 0 
(0.00) 
2 
(4.44) 
0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
1 
(3.57) 
3 
(2.40) 
30.00 
Total 
 
203 8 
(100.00) 
45 
(100.00) 
3 
(100.00) 
29 
(100.00) 
12 
(100.00) 
28 
(100.00) 
125 
(100.00) 
61.58 
Source: Field Survey 2006-07. 
Note: Figures in the parenthesis denote the percent of total interlinked transactions. 
 
interlinked transactions in the study area are more pronounced in the fixed-rent tenancy
12
 where 
the tenants are to bear all the costs of production. However, the limited liability clause [Basu, et 
al. (2000); Reddy (1996); Jones (1962)] is found to have empirical support; which means that in 
the event of crop failure the landlords come forward to forgo some of the contractual claims on 
the harvested crop. The limited liability clause is dominantly found in practice among the 
monogamous type of tenancy contract. The successful implementation of land reform 
programme in West Bengal has resulted in growing marginalisation of operated land in recent 
years. Under the circumstances, the transaction cost of acquiring lease in land constitutes a 
significant portion of total cost and thus, to reduce the transaction costs of negotiating with a 
multiple landlords, the tenants prefer monogamous type of tenancy. Over the years, they 
establish a relation of mutual cooperation with their respective landlords and take the advantage 
of limited liability in the event of uncertain outcome in agricultural production.  
 
5.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES: DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
 
Measurement of Allocative and Cost Efficiencies 
In this section, allocative and cost efficiencies of the interlinked holding vis-à-vis a 
comparable group of non-interlinked holding is measured in a disaggregated way.  The 
allocative and cost efficiency levels have been measured at different interlinkage types 
(credit-input, credit-labour, and credit-product) as well as under alternative crop of 
cultivations (i.e., amanswarna,
13
 paddy and all crops cultivation).  Moreover, the impact 
 
12Coexistence of all three tenurial practices-fixed-rent, pure sharecropping without cost sharing and 
sharecropping with cost sharing is prevalent in our surveyed villages. Fixed rent tenancy occupies a significant 
35 percent case of alternative mode of tenurial contract. 
13Amanswarna is most preferred HYV variety in terms of coverage of area in our study villages. In fact, 
aman paddy accounts for about two-thirds of the net cultivated areas in West Bengal [Chandra (1974)]. 
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of interlinked factor markets on the allocative efficiency across the two agro-climatic 
zones—irrigated and rain-fed areas—has also been measured (see Appendix).  
The Constant Returns to Scale Input-Oriented Multi Input-Multi Output DEA 
model is used in the study by using DEAP Version 2.1 statistical programme.  The model 
is comprised of data on output quantities, input quantities and prices of inputs. Output is 
measured by three variants: output of a particularly paddy variety like amanswarna, 
output of all paddy varieties in general and output of all crops measured as an equivalent 
of amanswarna.
14
 Three important input variables are chosen, viz. total operated area, 
total labour (both family and hired) used and total amount of fertiliser used in 
production.
15
 For simplicity, we assume all firms face the same input prices.  
In the case of credit-input interlinkage in amanswarna cultivation, 82 interlinked 
holdings and 132 non-interlinked holdings have been identified for the study. The  credit-
labour interlinkage dataset comprised of 42 interlinked holdings and 172 non-interlinked 
holdings. Similarly in the credit-product interlinkage the dataset included 16 interlinked 
holdings and 198 non-interlinked holdings. The estimated means of the efficiency scores 
for the three selected interlinkage patterns in three different cultivation practices are 
depicted in the following Tables 2, 3 and 4.   
 
Table 2 
Measurement of Allocative and Cost Efficiencies under Different Types of Interlinkage 
Pattern in Interlinked and Non-interlinked Holdings (Amanswarna Cultivation) 
Items Credit-Input Credit-Labour Credit-Product 
Interlinked Holdings 
Number of Holdings                                                      82 42 16 
Allocative Efficiency 
   Mean 
   Range 
   Standard Deviation 
0.856 
0.436-1.000 
0.080 
0.916 
0.588-1.000 
0.083 
0.880 
0.499-1.000 
0.075 
Cost Efficiency 
   Mean 
   Range 
   Standard Deviation 
0.587 
0.216-1.000 
0.110 
0.689 
0.261-1.000 
0.106 
0.628 
0.42-1.000 
0.103 
Non-interlinked Holdings 
Number of Holdings                                132 172 198 
Allocative Efficiency 
   Mean 
   Range 
   Standard Deviation 
0.730 
0.411-1.000 
0.114 
0.748 
0.332-1.000 
0.089 
0.730 
0.411-1.000 
0.141 
Cost Efficiency  
Mean 
Range 
Standard Deviation 
0.455 
0.089-1.000 
0.122 
0.455 
0.089-1.000 
0.147 
0.449 
0.089-1.000 
0.140 
Source:  Field Survey 2006-07. 
Note: The statistical analysis has been made using DEAP statistical package.  
 
14To measure a composite index of output of all crops, outputs of individual crops are converted as an 
equivalent of amanswarna. Prices of all crops are taken into account to make the necessary conversion. 
15In the study we have considered the potential econometric problem pertaining to the endogeneity of the 
interlinked contract. That is, more interlinked holdings may belong to smaller farmers. As a result, the Hausman (1978) 
method was used to test for the endogeneity of the interlinked contract. Instruments for the test included average years 
of schooling and availability of formal loan. The Hausman test failed to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity.  
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Table 3 
Measurement of Allocative and Cost Efficiencies under Different Types of Interlinkage  
Pattern in Interlinked and Non-interlinked Holdings (Paddy Cultivation) 
Items Credit-Input Credit-Labour Credit-Product 
Interlinked Holdings 
Number of Holdings                                                                            106 49 20 
Allocative Efficiency 
   Mean 
   Range 
   Standard Deviation 
0.912 
0.495-1.000 
0.082 
0.945 
0.854-1.000 
0.039 
0.898 
0.566-1.000 
0.109 
Cost Efficiency 
   Mean 
   Range 
   Standard Deviation 
0.687 
0.132-1.000 
0.102 
0.717 
0.261-1.000 
0.094 
0.723 
0.476-1.000 
0.091 
Non-interlinked Holdings 
Number of Holdings                                                                             146 203 232 
Allocative Efficiency 
   Mean 
   Range 
   Standard Deviation 
0.858 
0.307-1.000 
0.187 
0.874 
0.241-1.000 
0.178 
0.858 
0.307-1.000 
0.178 
Cost Efficiency  
   Mean 
   Range 
   Standard Deviation 
0.339 
0.029-1.000 
0.141 
0.339 
0.029-1.000 
0.149 
0.336 
0.029-1.000 
0.140 
Source: Field Survey 2006-07. 
Note: The statistical analysis has been made using DEAP statistical package. 
 
Table 4 
Measurement of Allocative and Cost Efficiencies under Different Types of Interlinkage 
Pattern in Interlinked and Non-interlinked Holdings (All Crops Cultivation) 
Items Credit-Input Credit-Labour Credit-Product 
Interlinked Holdings 
Number of Holdings                                                                                168 70 54 
Allocative Efficiency 
   Mean 
   Range 
   Standard Deviation 
0.852 
0.257-1.000 
0.179 
0.799 
0.182-1.000 
0.179 
0.845 
0.278-1.000 
0.190 
Cost Efficiency 
   Mean 
   Range 
   Standard Deviation 
0.302 
0.024-1.000 
0.113 
0.241 
0.004-1.000 
0.128 
0.277 
0.006-1.000 
0.097 
Non-interlinked Holdings 
Number of Holdings                                                                            135 233 249 
Allocative Efficiency 
   Mean 
   Range 
   Standard Deviation 
0.735 
0.116-1.000 
0.202 
0.630 
0.128-1.000 
0.215 
0.535 
0.116-1.000 
0.201 
Cost Efficiency  
Mean 
Range 
Standard Deviation 
0.154 
0.002-1.000 
0.133 
0.151 
0.002-1.000 
0.131 
0.156 
0.002-1.000 
0.172 
Source: Field Survey 2006-07. 
Note: The statistical analysis has been made using DEAP statistical package.  
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In amanswarna cultivation, allocative and cost efficiency scores are 0.856, and 
0.587 respectively for the credit-input interlinked holdings, whereas non-interlinked 
holdings accounts for 0.730, and 0.455 respectively (Table 2). This result indicates that 
even when there is an efficient resource allocation (in allocative sense) in both types of 
holdings, the credit-input interlinked holdings are, on average, more efficient in using the 
production input resources than the non-interlinked holdings. This trend remains the same 
irrespective of which efficiency measurement concept is taken into account. In addition, 
all the efficiency scores of credit-input interlinked holdings tended to be clustered around 
the value 1. This is evident from the smaller range and standard deviation of all three 
efficiency scores in case of interlinked holdings than that of the non-interlinked holdings 
(as for example, the values of the range and standard deviation of allocative efficiency 
are 0.436-1.000 and 0.080 for interlinked holdings and 0.411-1.000 and 0.114 for non-
interlinked holdings respectively). 
Like amanswarna, in paddy as well as in all crop cultivation, the interlinked 
holdings are found to be more efficient than the non-interlinked holdings (Table 3 and 
Table 4). From the estimated means of the different efficiency scores of interlinked and 
non-interlinked holdings (credit-input, credit-labour and credit-product interlinkages), it 
can be found that interlinked holdings are, on average, more efficient in the allocation of 
resources than non-interlinked holdings. The same pattern is observed irrespective of 
which efficiency measures (allocative or cost efficiency) or interlinkage pattern (credit-
input, credit-labour or credit-product interlinkage) is taken into consideration. Moreover, 
the range and standard deviation of all efficiency measurement scores for interlinked 
holdings have been estimated to be smaller than that of the non-interlinked holdings.  
The efficiency measures pertaining to the segregated contract types also re-
inforces our earlier contention that interlinked farms are more efficient than the non-
interlinked farms. In credit-input interlinkage, the lowest estimated allocative efficiency 
level is found to be 0.852 in all crops cultivation while the highest efficiency level is 
0.912 in paddy cultivation. On the other hand, in credit-input non-interlinked holdings, 
the lowest estimated allocative efficiency level is 0.730 in amanswarna cultivation while 
the highest efficiency level is 0.858 in paddy cultivation. Thus it is observed that the 
credit-input interlinkage can induce the tenant to adopt the efficient level of input use and 
thus can overcome sub-optimal input use resulting from risk aversion on the part of 
tenants in the study area. In a further comparison of estimated allocative efficiency in 
credit-labour interlinkage, it can be found that paddy cultivation corresponds to the 
highest allocative efficiency score (i.e. 0.945) in credit-labour interlinked holding, while 
the lowest efficiency score (i.e. 0.630) is associated with the credit-labour non-interlinked 
holding under all crops cultivation. A similar pattern of movement of allocative 
efficiency is also observed in case of credit-product interlinkage.
16
  
The above evidences support the neoclassical interpretation that the institution of 
interlinkage is one of the allocative efficiency improving institutions and thus, in turn, 
has a significant impact on more rapid adoption of innovation. In this interpretation, the 
interlocking of tenancy with production loans can ensure that tenants adopt efficiency in 
resources allocation and carry out those investments, which the profit-maximising 
 
16For figures relating to the allocative efficiency distributions of the credit-input, credit-labour and 
credit-product interlinked and non-interlinked holdings in paddy cultivation, see Laha (2009). 
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landlord considers most desirable. Again the interlocking of tenancy with labour service 
on the landlord’s farm or with control over the marketing of farm output are all 
mechanisms which can be used by the profit maximising landlord to extract the greatest 
work effort from the tenant [Ellis (1988)]. In other words, interlocking markets permits a 
greater control on the lives of the tenants and thus the immediate virtue is reflected by 
greater efficiency, higher production and more rapid innovation.  
 
Interlinkage and Optimum Input-Combinations 
In the section, observed input quantities used by the farmer are compared with the 
optimal input quantities to determine whether farmers are allocating resources efficiently 
or not. The narrower the gap between observed and optimal input quantities, the more 
efficient is the allocation of resources. On the other hand, the greater the gap, the higher 
is the scope to reduce the costs of production while keeping the output constant. 
The statistical software DEAP, version 2.1, routinely calculates cost minimising 
optimal input quantities at each farm level. The observed and optimal input quantities in 
paddy cultivation are presented in Table 5.
17
  
 
Table 5 
The Optimal Input Quantities with Respect to Cost Minimisation  
and the Observed Input Quantities in Paddy Cultivation 
Inputs 
Credit-Input Credit-Labour Credit-Product 
Cost 
Minimising 
Input qt. 
Observed 
Input qt. 
Cost 
Minimising 
Input qt. 
Observed 
Input qt. 
Cost 
Minimising 
Input qt. 
Observed 
Input qt. 
Interlinked Holdings 
Land (Acre) 
Labour (No/Acre) 
Fertiliser(Kg/Acre) 
1.013 
40.498 
125.283 
1.420 
41.925 
152.89 
0.542 
26.25 
112.235 
0.740 
30.323 
112.493 
1.305 
41.923 
152.885 
1.609 
42.588 
163.51 
Non-interlinked Holdings 
Land (Acre) 
Labour (No/Acre) 
Fertiliser(Kg/Acre) 
0.625 
39.973 
39.508 
1.823 
43.89 
85.89 
0.653 
39.97 
39.505 
1.874 
45.40 
105.545 
0.567 
39.97 
39.505 
1.657 
42.45 
110.71 
Source: Field Survey 2006-07. 
Note: The statistical analysis has been made using DEAP statistical package.  
 
Table 5 suggests that in most of the cases, farmers are not using inputs in an 
optimal manner. It is evident that the optimal input quantities are distinctly different from 
the observed input quantities used by farmers. To achieve an optimal input combination, 
inputs should be used in lower proportion than are being applied presently. Thus there is 
a further scope to produce a given level of output by using the cost-minimising input 
ratios. Empirical evidences further suggest that credit-labour interlinked holdings are 
more efficient in the allocative sense than non-interlinked holdings. This is reflected in 
the observed differences between optimal and observed input quantities. The gap between 
the optimal and observed input quantities in credit-labour interlinked holding is smaller 
(observed and optimal input quantities are 0.542 and 0.740 respectively in land; 26.25 
and 30.323 respectively in labour per acre; 112.235 and 112.493 respectively in chemical 
 
17For all other tables relating to amanswarna, and all crops cultivation, see Laha (2009). 
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fertiliser used per acre) than credit-labour non-interlinked holding (observed and optimal 
input quantities are 0.653 and 1.874 respectively in land; 39.97 and 45.40 respectively in 
labour per acre; 39.505 and 105.545 respectively in chemical fertiliser used per acre).  
 
Interlinkage and Farm-Size Efficiency 
Allocative efficiency in agriculture is invariably associated with the farm-size 
classification of operated land holdings. An attempt has been made in this section to 
analyse the impact of farm size on allocative efficiency in the interlinked as well as non-
interlinked holdings. The result in respect of paddy cultivation is presented in Table 6.
18
 
It is evident that interlinked holdings exhibit a higher level of allocative efficiency on 
average relative to the non-interlinked holdings irrespective of farm size. In paddy 
cultivation, there is significant difference in allocative efficiency estimates under 
interlinked holdings than the corresponding figure in non-interlinked holdings (as for 
example, in credit-input interlinkage the allocative efficiency estimates are 0.9026 and 
0.8178 respectively in marginal holding, 0.912 and 0.8578 respectively in small holding, 
0.9395  and  0.9387  respectively  in medium holding).  The  general  trend does not hold  
 
Table 6 
Measurement of Allocative Efficiencies Across Operated Land Sizes  
in Different Pattern of Interlinkages (Paddy Cultivation) 
Operated Land 
  (in Acre) 
Interlinked Holdings Non-interlinked Holdings 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
Number (%) of 
Firms 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
Number (%) of 
Firms 
Credit-Input Interlinkage 
Less than 2.5 
2.5-5 
5-10 
Above 10 
Total 
0.9026 
0.912 
0.9395 
0.9257 
0.9119 
59 (55.66) 
25 (23.58) 
19 (17.92) 
03 (2.84) 
106 (100.00) 
0.8178 
0.8578 
0.9387 
0.9747 
0.8579 
87 (59.59) 
22 (15.07) 
24 (16.44) 
13 (8.90) 
146 (100.00) 
Credit-Labour Interlinkage 
Less than 2.5 
2.5-5 
5-10 
Above 10 
Total 
0.9617 
0.9406 
0.9444 
– 
0.9451 
41 (83.67) 
05  (10.20) 
03  (06.13) 
– 
49 (100.00) 
0.8132 
0.9141 
0.9515 
0.9709 
0.8740 
105 (51.72) 
42 (20.69) 
40 (19.70) 
16 (07.89) 
203 (100.00) 
Credit-Product Interlinkage 
Less than 2.5 
2.5-5 
5-10 
Above 10 
Total 
0.8661 
0.9947 
– 
0.956 
0.8976 
15 (75.00) 
03 (15.00) 
– 
02 (10.00) 
20 (100.00) 
0.8087 
0.8846 
0.9447 
0.9755 
0.8586 
131 (56.48) 
44   (18.96) 
43   (18.53) 
14   (06.03) 
232  (100.00) 
Source: Field Survey 2006-07. 
Note: The statistical analysis has been made using DEAP statistical package.  
 
18Ibid, Laha (2009). 
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true in large operated landholdings where interlinked holding above 10 acre of operated 
land exhibited a lower level of allocative efficiency on average relative to that of non-
interlinked holdings. No such general conclusion can be drawn in regard to the pattern of 
credit-labour interlinkage due to insufficient number of observations in such interlinked 
holdings. In other disaggregated analysis of amanswarna cultivation and aggregative 
analysis of all crops cultivation; the general trend that interlinked holdings exhibit a 
higher level of allocative efficiency on average relative to the non-interlinked holdings 
irrespective of farm size holds true. Thus it seems plausible that the inclusion of 
interlinked contract has a significant impact on allocative efficiency in production.  
In a further comparison of estimated allocative efficiencies between two groups of 
farmers (interlinked and non-interlinked) across operated farm sizes, it can be argued that 
the allocative efficiencies increase with the increase in the size of operated land in non-
interlinked holdings. Large farmers are more efficient in allocating resources in 
production than small farmers. In paddy cultivation, the highest allocative efficiency (i.e. 
0.9747) is found for large farms in credit-input interlinked holding, whereas the marginal 
farm is associated with the lowest efficiency measure (i.e. 8178). The general trend of 
increase in allocative efficiency with the increase in operated land sizes in interlinked 
holding is true irrespective of which interlinkage pattern (credit-input, credit-labour, and 
credit-product) or which crop (amanswarna, paddy or all crops) is taken into 
consideration. However, the general conclusion does not appear to be valid when we 
consider the association between allocative efficiency measurement and operated land 
size in interlinked holdings. In paddy cultivation, medium farmers (5-10 acre) are more 
efficient in credit-input interlinkage (the estimated allocative efficiency measure becomes 
0.9395) than other categories of farmers. In credit-labour interlinkage marginal farmers 
(less than 2.5 acre) are more efficient in allocating resources than their other counterparts. 
In credit-product interlinkage, the highest efficiency measure is 0.9947 for small farmers 
(2.5–5 acre)  compared to other categories of farmers. A similar trend is found in other 
cultivations (i.e. amanswarna and all crops) also. In fact in the analysis of other 
cultivations, small and middle farmers’ categories comprising 2.5–5 acre and 5-10 acre of 
land respectively are more efficient in allocating inputs at optimal level. In few instances, 
marginal farmers have a higher level of allocative efficiency than the respective other 
categories of farmers in interlinked holdings.  
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
In the backdrop of the controversy of two distinct schools of thought, the Neo-
classical and the Marxist, this paper deals with the implications of interlinked rural factor 
markets on the allocation of resources. Empirical evidences from rural West Bengal, 
suggest that interlinked holdings are more efficient in using the farm inputs than a 
comparable group of non-interlinked holdings. The conclusion remains valid irrespective 
of types of crop and the nature of interlinkages. Thus the econometric estimation based 
on Data Envelopment Analysis supports the neoclassical presumption that interlinked 
transactions resulted in improving the allocative efficiency in agricultural production. 
However, allocative efficiencies between interlinked and non-interlinked holdings are not 
uniformly observed across operated farm size. Allocative efficiency is invariably found to 
be higher in interlinked transactions than their non-interlinked counterpart irrespective of 
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irrigated and rain-fed areas. Interestingly, both under interlinked and non-interlinked 
mode of cultivation, there appears to be a gap between observed and optimal input 
combinations. The gap is more pronounced in the case of non-interlinked mode of 
cultivation. This further strengthens our earlier conclusion that interlinkage is motivated 
by the desire for efficient institutional arrangements in the allocation of resources in the 
backdrop of factor market imperfections. In the process of transformation of Indian 
agriculture, the role of labour in interlinked credit transactions has declined whereas the 
input and output market has increasingly occupied a prominent role in interlinked 
transactions. In this perspective, an emphasis on the availability of institutional credit is 
expected to reduce the dependence of such interlinked transactions as such transactions 
are evolved to mitigate the imperfections of certain rural institutions. Thus, the policy 
requirement is to make these vital inputs, like credit, available to the tenant and not to 
encourage interlinked markets. 
 
APPENDIX 
An attempt has been made to examine how interlinked factor markets influence the 
allocative efficiency across the two agro-climatic zones-irrigated and rain-fed areas
19
 
(Table A1). The allocative efficiency scores for the credit-labour interlinked and non-
interlinked holdings in case of irrigated area have been estimated as 0.800 and 0.613, 
whereas rain-fed area accounts for 0.799 and 0.647, respectively. Though the efficiency 
level of the interlinked holdings is significantly higher than the non-interlinked holdings, 
however, the level of variation in efficiency in two agro-climatic zones is insignificant. 
Thus interlinked holdings are found to be efficient in the allocation of resources 
irrespective of the nature of agro-climatic zones in the study area.   
 
Table A1 
Measurement of Allocative Efficiencies under Different Types of Interlinkage Across  
Irrigated and Rain-fed Surveyed Area (All Crops Cultivation) 
Nature of Interlinkage Holdings Mean Range 
Standard 
Deviation 
Irrigated Area 
Credit-labour Interlinkage 28 0.800 0.226-0.965 0.154 
Credit-labour Non-interlinkage 118 0.613 0.128-1.000 0.245 
Credit-input Interlinkage 67 0.866 0.305-1.000 0.191 
Credit-input Non-interlinkage 79 0.738 0.257-0.916 0.173 
Credit-product Interlinkage 16 0.840 0.116-0.999 0.198 
Credit-product Non-interlinkage 130 0.558 0.278-1.000 0.209 
Rain-fed Area 
Credit-labour Interlinkage 42 0.799 0.321-0.999 0.190 
Credit-labour Non-interlinkage 115 0.647 0.182-1.000 0.198 
Credit-input Interlinkage 101 0.842 0.266-1.000 0.186 
Credit-input Non-interlinkage 56 0.731 0.116-0.999 0.208 
Credit-product Interlinkage 38 0.849 0.128-1.000 0.203 
Credit-product Non-interlinkage 119 0.480 0.309-0.775 0.110 
 
19The larger extent of two-tier interlinkage in rain-fed area is a distinguishing characteristic of our 
survey area. Thus the complex nature of two-tier interlinkage is predominantly a characteristic of relatively 
backward agriculture.  
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